How slow digital transformation helps democracy
Christian R. Ulbrich is using a monitor to observe the progress of digital transformation in different countries. In the first version, he compares four European states. His conclusion? Faster is not necessarily better. And Switzerland’s decentralized course is a smart strategy.
23 June 2025 | Catherine Weyer
Christian Ulbrich, why are you monitoring the digital transformation efforts of countries from the standpoint of democracy?
The pure progress of digital transformation is already being monitored by various institutions, from the OECD to the UN. The top ranks are occupied by countries that are already ahead in their digital transformation. Estonia is considered to be one of these pioneers. Countries such as Switzerland and Germany tend to fall behind in rankings because they still have a long way to go with their digital transformation. But this ignores how this digitalization happens and whether it is implemented in a way that is compatible with democracy. That’s always bothered me. Countries such as Switzerland and Germany consciously accept a longer process in order to pursue a different approach and establish high digital standards.
What does this “better” digital transformation look like?
We describe this digital transformation as “compatible with democracy.” On the one hand, it focuses on all three branches of power and ensures that, even in a digitalized world, parliaments, courts and public administrations can meet on an equal footing. On the other hand, it seeks to avoid new concentrations of power in the field of public administration that, over time, could undermine the distribution of influence across many different shoulders which is so essential for functioning democracies.
What does that mean specifically?
One aspect of this is a decentralized approach to digital transformation based on open, harmonized standards, interfaces and protocols. If, for example, individual public authorities gain access to too much data in the course of digital transformation, this is problematic. Not necessarily in a well-functioning democracy, but in countries where illiberal or autocratic movements come to power. When data storage is decentralized, it is much more difficult to misuse information about the population or create profiles about individuals and potentially also undesirable people, because there is always someone in between who has to agree to this query.
How realistic is this kind of scenario?
Around the world, liberal democracies are unfortunately in retreat. The US, in particular, shows that even very “old” and experienced democracies can come under pressure. A year ago, it would have been inconceivable that the data of millions of citizens from various databases could be brought together in one central place with the help of a private company. Today it is a fact. Brazil has shown that this is not a good idea. The Brazilian intelligence agency requested more than 75 million records from the state-run “superdatabase” in one month. They found information on financial data, health data, crime data, biometric data and so on. It is obvious that this information was later used to monitor political opponents. But other countries, such as Poland and Hungary, also prove that democracies and their values are not set in stone.
Would it be better to avoid digital transformation?
No, not at all! Digital transformation is one of the greatest challenges of our generation. We need digitalization, including digital transformation of the state, to govern successfully in an increasingly digital and complex world. This also provides a unique opportunity to weatherproof democratic institutions and make them more resilient as they move into the digital world. However, I believe we also have to take enough time to develop suitable digital systems.
Where do you see the greatest risks in the digitalization of the state?
The danger is that we will unthinkingly adopt the methods and approaches that are already established in the private sector, and which work well there, for the state apparatus. However, systems have to meet different criteria for the state. In the context of the digital economy, the primary factors are costs, control, tracking and user-friendliness; in democracies, the focus should be on the separation of powers, the distribution of influence and participation. Of course, user-friendliness is important for acceptance; citizens want to be able to fill in their forms with a single click. But from a constitutional law perspective, what happens in the background, how exactly the data gets into the form, is much more important.
Your monitor focuses on four countries: Switzerland, Germany, the UK and Estonia. What’s special about these countries?
In addition to Switzerland, we look at Germany and the UK, the two largest economies in Europe with different political systems – Germany’s structure is similar to Switzerland’s, the UK is much more centralist. Estonia, on the other hand, was one of the first countries to go digital. We have seen that Germany and Switzerland took a completely different approach than the UK and Estonia – the extent of the differences surprised us. At the same time, Switzerland and Germany are much slower. However, I don’t think we should interpret that as a negative. Both countries are focusing on decentralized, federalist solutions. While it takes more time to implement them, they could be more successful in the long run.
In what way?
In economic research, they illustrate this using the “leapfrogging” model. Countries that started early, such as Estonia and the UK, had to build their digital transformation on the technology and knowledge available at the time. They are now somewhat “trapped” in their initial approach, the architectural model or the technology. In contrast, Switzerland and Germany, which launched later, can build on a completely different technology and knowledge base and, over time, may even “leapfrog” over the other two countries.
What is Switzerland’s current position on this issue?
Let’s take the example of the separation of powers. It is important that the three powers – the judiciary, executive and legislative – are balanced. It is often the case that public administration is further along in the process of digital transformation. If parliament can no longer independently verify the public administration’s digital information because it does not have its own sources of digital information, there is a power imbalance that can be dangerous for democracy. The same applies to the courts. They too have to be able to cope with the flood of digital information and ensure they’re not dependent on the administration. Interestingly, Switzerland is already very well positioned when it comes to parliaments and courts. In contrast to the other countries we’ve surveyed, digital transformation is taking the right approach. However, public administration is lagging behind somewhat.
Why?
Curiously, this is probably due to the fact that it also works very well in analog form. There is not enough pressure to drive digital transformation. This has the negative effect that digital transformation is currently being promoted primarily at the federal level. However, this is not the final verdict – public administrations are only at the start of their journey. Government digital transformation is a mammoth project; we’re probably talking about the next two decades.
You mentioned that Estonia is a pioneer. How quickly does Switzerland need to catch up in terms of digital transformation?
I don’t think we should talk about catching up in this context. But we can learn from countries that are further ahead and also avoid mistakes. Here, our monitor aims to create transparency and also to show possible long-term consequences for the functioning of democracies. It is precisely this last point that has been lacking in the international debate surrounding digital transformation to date.
Monitoring the resilience of democracies in the digital age
In a broad-based study, the electronic Public Institutions and Administrations Research Forum e-PIAF has been investigating the consequences of government digital transformation for the democratic system and its institutions, comparing Switzerland with Germany, Estonia and the UK. The first monitor, focusing on the internal structural organization of the state, will be published in June 2025, to be followed by a second and third monitor that looks at the relationship of state to citizenry and the relationship of state to extraterritorial forces. After that, there are plans for regular updates on developments.
